Netenyahu and the Masada Complex

Israel will be committing suicide if it withdraws from occupied land, according to Netenyahu. In saying this, he expresses clearly his position towards the entire peace process. Nor does he leave any doubt as to where he stands on the Declaration of Principles known as the Oslo Accord. In his view, that agreement was an attempt to push Israelis toward the rock of Masada to commit collective suicide; and as the protector of Israel, Netenyahu will reject that option.

If Netenyahu, and other Israelis, are truly afraid, what is the true reason for their fear? Is it fear of an individual "suicide" -- the killing of Jew by Jew, as in the assassination of Rabin? Or is it fear of a collective suicide undertaken in order to prevent an even worse fate, as at Masada? Or is it fear of nothing more than that Netenyahu will lose his position as head of the Israeli government?

Israeli psychologist Zeveet Abramson has offered an analysis which suggests the last possibility is the real one. Abramson, a specialist in marriage counseling, in an article in the Dec. 14, 1997, Ma’ariv under the title "Like Sara, like Netenyahu", wrote that the story of Benjamin and Sara leaves a psychologist with the impression that the husband (the prime minister), who chose this wife to be his partner, is also the same person who sees in his position a way of achieving status, majesty and power. His decisions are directed toward maintaining his position, rather than toward furthering the general good.

Netenyahu’s decision on redeployment deceives even his colleagues in the Likud and the ministerial cabinet. He wants to achieve the minimum in terms of withdrawal, even though he is under maximum US pressure. In this regard he differs from Ehud Barak, who thinks that if the Accord is implemented under any amount of US pressure, this will set a precedent which will harm Israel’s position in the final status negotiations.

Netenyahu’s attempt to fabricate crises with the US administration to strengthen his position within the Likud and within the Israeli right, and his attempt to present himself as the guardian and protector of the land of Israel and its future, makes him look as if he is searching for concessions from his own citizens so he can satisfy the US and maintain his own position without regard for the other partner in the peace process -- the Palestinian people represented by the PLO and the PNA. The negotiations Netenyahu is conducting within his government to reach an agreement have nothing to do with the agreement which should be implemented with the Palestinians. While the Palestinians are emphasizing their adherence to the agreements signed by the PLO and the Israeli government, negotiations within the Israeli government continue on how to annul these very agreements in such a way that Palestinians take the blame, on the grounds that rejection of the agreement came from the Palestinian side. In contrast to Palestinian negotiators, who assure Israel that withdrawal from Palestinian land will mean peace and security for the entire region, Netenyahu persists in saying that withdrawal from Palestinian land means suicide. In spite of Netenyahu’s efforts, one can say that the Palestinian stand, due to its objectivity and credibility, has achieved from the US at least a small gain which mitigates, at least to a small extent, the flagrant bias of the US administration as hitherto exemplified by US negotiators such as Dennis Ross. The lessening of the bias which has been up to now characteristic of the US in its dealings in the negotiations could never have come about without the wise policy adopted by the Palestinian leadership. However, such a policy will not suffice. The situation requires the activation of other options on the part of Palestinians, if we are to confront Israeli’s settlement policy. All legal options should be employed to fight the occupation.

The Israeli army, the IDF, which usually does not intervene in political issues, is now beginning to worry, because it fears the politically unrealistic ideology of Netenyahu. Uzi Benzamin wrote on this subject in Ha’aretz on Dec. 14, 1997, under the title "Will the Israeli Army Become a Scapegoat Because of Netenyahu’s Approach?" In this article, he said that there are some people who doubt that Netenyahu intends ever to begin final status negotiations. In the event that final status negotiations are held, they are destined to fail because Netenyahu’s government will not agree to relocate any settlements. Given this scenario, the interim pullback will create a difficult security situation, according to Benjamin. The Israeli government, he asserts, must declare its true position in public. He warns against turning the Israeli army into a scapegoat, using as a reason any role it might play in such a situation.

Preserving the peace process requires firm adherence to the peace accords, as the Palestinian leadership is fully aware. The fact that the Palestinian leadership is aware of the need to adhere to the peace accords gives its position credibility and helps the leadership maintain support for the Palestinian cause within the international community, including the Arab countries and even some segments of Israeli society. It should also be stressed that the aim of the Israeli maneuvers, including the production of maps showing plans for annexation and the division of Palestinian land into segregated communities by the creation of roads running East and West and North and South throughout the West Bank, stems from Likud ideology which was expressed 20 years ago. In one project, the Israeli Droblis proposed a plan for settlement in what he called Judaea and Sumaria, the aim of which was to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank. This plan outlined the establishment of settlements on a series of mountains as a way of creating a barrier against a potentially strong, unified Eastern Arab front which it was thought could threaten Israel. The barrier was also to give Jordan Valley settlers a first front-line in the East, allowing them a sense of security and preventing their being besieged by enemies from either East or West. State and uncultivated lands were to be immediately confiscated, according to the plan. Roads were to be built between the settler communities to prevent the establishment of another Arab state. The plan aimed to make it difficult for the "minority" population to achieve territorial continuity or to create a political entity. [This description of the Droblis Plan was taken from Miron Benvensty’s book, The West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Data and Political Statistics, p. 164.]

The realities to which the parties committed themselves in signing the peace agreements utterly contradict the reality which Netenyahu’s government hopes to bring about with complete disregard for the other party involved. The adherence of the Palestinian leadership to the agreements signed, along with the leadership’s refusal to renegotiate what has already been agreed upon, is the greatest weapon in Palestinian hands. This Palestinian stand may help to bring about a more objective perspective on the part of the US administration and, hopefully, increased efforts on the part of the US to save the peace process. The Palestinian position vis-à-vis settlements and redeployment is precisely in line with the Interim Agreement, signed in Washington by both Palestinian and Israeli representatives on Sept. 28, 1995. Article 17, Item 2, Paragraph A, of the Agreement states:

" The territorial jurisdiction of the Council shall encompass Gaza Strip territory, except for the Settlements and the Military Installation Area shown on map No. 2, and West Bank territory, except for Area C, which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Council. At this time, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. Territorial jurisdiction includes land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement."

Also in line with the Palestinian position, Article 31, Item 5, specifies the permanent status issues. These are: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

On the illegality of settlements, Article 3, Item 6, says, "Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status."

It is clear that the Palestinian people, including their leadership, agree on full adherence to the peace accords both in letter and in spirit. This spirit was clearly not shared, however, by the Israeli government and the Israeli right wing, as evidenced by the outcome of the internal discussions conducted by these parties. It is important to mention in this regard the fact that the peace accords were the result of bilateral negotiations, in which the two parties reached a compromise. Therefore, Israel should not be allowed unilaterally to cancel these accords. Moreover, if the Israeli government aims at preserving its unity, it should know that the laughable schemes it is presenting to the Palestinian people will fall on deaf ears. Our leadership not only wants to preserve a unified position among its people, but also to the principles which have guided Fateh’s struggle from the beginning.

Any agreement reached by extremists in the right wing Israeli government aims at undoing whatever achievements have been made by the Palestinian people. Right-wing Israelis, it seems, are particularly unhappy with the fact that Palestinians have established a Palestinian National Authority and shown their determination to establish their own state, with Jerusalem as its capital. The aim of Netenyahu’s government, far from recognizing such an entity, is clearly to reorganize its occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by allotting to Palestinians merely the so-called "self-rule" area. Such a development would place any Palestinian Authority under Israeli rule. Not only does the Israeli government envision just this reality, but it attempts to obtain the endorsement of Palestinians in carrying out the plan.

In the face of this effort, our movement, Fateh, will continue to adhere to the promise it has made to remain faithful to the blood of those martyrs who died in order to secure a better future for us.

 

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